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COMMERCIAL LAW
I. SIX MONTH LIMITATIONS PERIOD ON MECHANICS LIENS BEGINS
WHEN LIENOR FILES NOTICE OF LIEN
In Preferred Savings & Loan Association v. Royal Garden Resort,
Inc.1 the South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the requirements for
perfecting and enforcing mechanics liens. A majority of the court held
that a lienor must bring suit to foreclose on a mechanics lien within six
months of filing notice of the lien regardless of whether the lienor per-
formed additional work on the project after filing notice.2 Because of
the court's rule, title examiners may assume that property is free of
mechanics liens if they do not find a petition for foreclosure or lis
pendens on the property within six months of the date on which the
lienor recorded the lien.3 Title examiners still cannot be certain, how-
ever, whether a mechanics lien exists merely by checking the public
records.
4
Preferred Savings involved a dispute between the developer,
builder, and mortgagee of a condominium project in Garden City,
South Carolina. Cianbro Corporation (Cianbro), the builder, entered
into a fixed-price contract with Royal Garden Resort, Inc. (Royal Gar-
den), the developer, to construct the project. Preferred Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (Preferred Savings), the mortgagee, took a note
and mortgage from Royal Garden in March 1983.
Cianbro began work on the condominium project in March 1983.
By June 1984 the project was substantially completed, thereby enti-
tling Cianbro to the remainder of its fees under the contract with
Royal Garden.5 On August 13, 1984, Cianbro served and filed a notice
of mechanics lien for the entire fixed price due under the contract."
Cianbro completed the project in November 1984.
Cianbro filed suit to foreclose on its lien on April 2, 1985. Pre-
ferred Savings filed suit to foreclose on its mortgage on June 18, 1985.
The trial court consolidated the actions, and Preferred Savings chal-
lenged the validity of Cianbro's mechanics lien.
1. 301 S.C. 1, 389 S.E.2d 853 (1990), af'g 295 S.C. 268, 368 S.E.2d 78 (Ct. App.
1988).
2. Id. at 4-5, 389 S.E.2d at 855.
3. Id. at 5, 389 S.E.2d at 855.
4. See id. at 8-9, 389 S.E.2d at 857 (Toal, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 3, 389 S.E.2d at 854.
6. Id. at 6, 389 S.E.2d at 855 (Toal, J., dissenting).
1
et al.: Commercial Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
COMMERCIAL LAW
The supreme court held that Cianbro's failure to bring suit on its
mechanics lien within six months of the date it filed notice dissolved
the lien.7 In reaching its decision, the court focused on two statutes
that control the perfection and enforcement of mechanics liens. First,
the court referred to South Carolina Code section 29-5-90,1 which reads
in relevant part:
Such a lien shall be dissolved unless the person desiring to avail
himself thereof, within ninety days after he ceases to labor on or fur-
nish labor or materials for such building or structure, serves upon the
owner ... and files in the office of the register of mesne conveyances
or clerk of court of the county in which the building or structure is
situated a statement of a just and true account of the amount due
him, with all just credits given, together with a description of the
property intended to be covered by the Hen sufficiently accurate for
identification... which certificate shall be subscribed and sworn to
by the person claiming the lien.. .. 9
Second, the court looked to South Carolina Code section 29-5-120,11
which reads, "Unless a suit for enforcing the lien is commenced, and
notice of pendency of the action is filed, within six months after the
person desiring to avail himself thereof ceases to labor on or furnish
labor or material for such building or structures, the lien shall be dis-
solved.""' The court concluded that because both provisions impose
time limitations based on when the lienor ceases to furnish labor or
materials on the project, both limitations begin at the same point in
time. 2 The court ruled that "[t]he effect of these provisions is that the
six month limitations period for enforcing the lien necessarily com-
mences no later than the date the certificate of lien is filed.
'13
The court explained that its holding was necessary to avoid "un-
certainty and confusion" among title examiners. 4 The court reasoned
7. Id. at 5, 389 S.E.2d at 855.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-5-90 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 29-5-120.
11. Id.
12. Preferred Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Royal Garden Resort, Inc., 301 S.C. 1, 4, 389
S.E.2d 853, 854 (1990).
13. Id. at 4-5, 389 S.E.2d at 855. In a footnote the court clarified its ruling:
If the certificate of lien is filed on the date that labor ceases, suit must be
brought within six months thereafter. For each additional day between the
date of cessation of labor and the date of filing, the time between filing and
commencement of suit is reduced by one day. Thus, if the certificate were filed
on the 90th day after cessation of labor, suit must be commenced three months
after the filing.
Id. at 5 n.1, 389 S.E.2d at 855 n.1.
14. Id. at 5, 389 S.E.2d at 855.
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that title examiners should not have to look beyond the public records
to determine whether the lienor had furnished labor or materials after
the date on which the mechanics lien was filed.'
5
In a strong dissent Justice Toal argued that section 29-5-90 does
not require a contractor to have completed a project before filing a
notice of mechanics lien, but rather provides an outside time limitation
within which notice of the lien must be filed.16 Justice Toal argued that
the key point in time for the beginning of the six month statute of
limitations was when the contractor ceased to work on the project, not
when the contractor filed notice. Justice Toal stated that section 29-5-
120 does not mention the date of filing of the certificate of lien and
instead explicitly provides that its six month period begins after cessa-
tion of labor or the furnishing of materials. 7 Cianbro ceased work in
November 1984 and commenced its foreclosure action within six
months thereof. To say that Cianbro did not comply with section 29-5-
120 is to read requirements into the section that do not exist.18
The Preferred Savings court stopped short of expressly holding
that the work which entitles a contractor to a mechanics lien must be
completed before filing.' 9 The court stated that the contractor must
assert in its notice that it has completed such work as would entitle it
to a lien.20 By June 1984 Cianbro had substantially completed the con-
dominium project, thereby entitling it to the remainder of its fees
under the contract with Royal Garden.2' The court concluded that
Cianbro established a mechanics lien when Cianbro filed its August 13,
1984 notice. Cianbro's foreclosure action, filed on April 2, 1985, there-
fore, was too late, even though Cianbro had not ceased to labor on the
project until November 1984.22
It remains unclear whether the court would allow a lienor to toll
the six month limitations period if the lienor stated in its notice that
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7, 389 S.E.2d at 856.
17. Id. at 8, 389 S.E.2d at 856. Justice Toal also found "suspect" the majority's ar-
gument that its holding was necessary to prevent confusion among title examiners. Id. at
8-9, 389 S.E.2d at 857.
18. In the past the South Carolina Supreme Court tended to liberalize the notice
requirements in favor of protecting a lienor's security. See Wood v. Hardy, 235 S.C. 131,
110 S.E.2d 157 (1959); Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 229 S.C. 619,
93 S.E.2d 855 (1956). In more recent decisions, however, South Carolina courts have
enforced the statutory notice requirements strictly. See Multiplex Bldg. Corp. v. Lyles,
268 S.C. 577, 235 S.E.2d 133 (1977); Muller v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 399
S.E.2d 430 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
19. See Preferred Savings, 301 S.C. at 7, 389 S.E.2d at 856 (Toal, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 4, 389 S.E.2d at 854.
21. Id. at 3, 389 S.E.2d at 854.
22. Id. at 4-5, 389 S.E.2d at 855.
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work on the project had not been completed or would be completed at
a later date. Such a notice would alert title examiners that a lien may
exist on the property. Title examiners would have to look, however,
beyond the public records to discover if the date listed in the notice
was erroneous.23
Given the supreme court's stated policy in Preferred Savings of
promoting clarity and certainty in the public records2' and its strict
reading of the mechanics liens statutes,25 contractors must be ex-
tremely careful when perfecting mechanics liens. In any situation in
which the date labor ceases is different from the date of notice filing,
the lienor must be aware that two time limitations are running, not
just one. Waiting to file notice will reduce the time in which lienors can
foreclose after the notice is recorded. On the other hand, filing notice
before labor actually ceases will start the six month statute of limita-
tions. The supreme court will likely continue to strictly construe the
mechanics liens statutes in an effort to promote clarity and certainty in
the public records.
Robert E. August
II. JUDICIAL SALE SET ASIDE SOLELY BECAUSE OF AN INADEQUATE
PRICE
In Investors Savings Bank v. Phelps6 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the set aside of a mortgage foreclosure sale solely be-
cause of a grossly inadequate price. For the first time, a South Carolina
court affirmed the set aside of a judicial sale in the absence of other
circumstances2 7 warranting such action. The court also stated that the
amount of a note and the purchase money mortgage that secures the
note can be competent evidence of the property's current value, but
the court did not establish a clear standard for determining whether a
23. As Justice Toal points out in her dissent, the majority's decision does not enable
title examiners to rely completely on the public records when checking for mechanics
liens. See id. at 8-9, 389 S.E.2d at 857 (discussing Willard v. Finch, 121 S.C. 1, 113
S.E.2d 302 (1922)).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
25. See cases cited supra note 18.
26. 397 S.E.2d 780 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
27. Other circumstances may include a variety of acts and conditions which would
impeach the fairness of the transaction such as mistaken or improper action by the of-
ficer making the sale or improper conduct of the bidder or other participants. Examples
of improper conduct include attempts to stifle competition, chill the bidding, or take any
other undue or unfair advantage. See Raleigh & C.R. Co. v. Baltimore Nat'l Bank, 41 F.
Supp. 599, 601 (E.D.S.C. 1941).
1991]
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particular price is adequate.2 8
Investors Savings Bank (Investors) instituted an action to fore-
close its mortgage on a parcel of residential property and demanded a
deficiency judgment. The note had a balance due of $52,369.80 plus
interest. At the foreclosure sale Investors submitted a bid of $500,
which was the highest bid received.29 The nominal amount of this bid
was the result of a mistaken communication from the mortgagee to its
attorney and the absence of other bidders at the sale. But for the mis-
take, the mortgagee would have bid $45,467.00, which represented the
appraised value of the property less the estimated costs of foreclosure
and resale.30
Because Investors demanded a deficiency judgment, the bidding
remained open for thirty days. 31 On the thirtieth day Johnny M.
Flynn, a third party who had no relationship to the mortgage transac-
tion, bid $510. Upon a motion made by Investors, the master set aside
the sale because the price was grossly inadequate.
3 2
In affirming the master's decision, the court of appeals relied on
the rule enunciated in Poole v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance
Co.,33 which provides that judicial sales will not be set aside based on
"'inadequacy of price unless it is so gross, as to shock the conscience, or
accompanied by other circumstances warranting the interference of the
court.' ,,3 The court emphasized that this rule contemplates two po-
tential applications because the use of the disjunctive term "or" indi-
cates that either of two conditions, gross inadequacy of price or inade-
quacy of price coupled with "other circumstances," would provide a
basis for setting aside a judicial sale.3 5 The appellant argued that the
court should interpret the rule to mean that other circumstances al-
ways should be required because in all prior decisions the courts relied
on other circumstances to set aside the sale.3 8 The court found this
argument unpersuasive.
28. Investors, 397 S.E.2d at 782.
29. Id. at 781.
30. Record at 22.
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-39-720 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (preventing the high bidder
at the original sale from entering any other bid during the thirty-day period in which the
bidding remains open); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.
32. Investors, 397 S.E.2d at 781.
33. 174 S.C. 150, 177 S.E. 24 (1934).
34. Investors, 397 S.E.2d at 781 (quoting Poole, 174 S.C. at 157, 177 S.E. at 27).
35. Id.; see also Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inade-
quacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 843, 859-70 (1980) (discussing
majority rule in American jurisdictions).
36. Investors, 397 S.E.2d at 781.
37. Id. The court noted that several recent decisions clearly stated that the two-
prong standard is still good law in South Carolina. Id. at 781-82 (citing Hamilton v.
[Vol. 43
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The court further noted that the purchase money mortgage and
the amount of the note that it secured is competent evidence of the
property's value.38 The court did not, however, articulate a clear stan-
dard for determining when a price is grossly inadequate. The court
noted that Flynn's bid represented slightly more than one percent of
the original amount of the note and mortgage. The court also noted
that in Poole the bid represented approximately ten percent of the
value of the property sold.39 In addition, the court looked to other ju-
risdictions. In Looper v. Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Associa-
tion4o the bid set aside by the Arkansas Supreme Court was less than
five percent of the property's value.41 The court also referred to New
York precedent in which bids of less than ten percent of value were
routinely set aside.
42
Investors represented the first opportunity for the court to apply
only the first prong of the Poole standard and was the culmination of a
gradual but complete reversal in the judicial attitude toward setting
aside judicial sales. The early view was articulated in Coleman v. Bank
of Hamburg,43 in which the court stated: "It is settled law, that where
unfair means have not been employed to prevent competition at sher-
iff's sales, inadequacy of price, however great, is no ground for setting
them aside. Whether wise or not, this is the law of South Carolina." 44
In the 1915 decision of Bonham v. Cave45 the gross inadequacy ground
became a part of the rule.4 6 In 1934 the supreme court relied upon the
Patterson, 236 S.C. 487, 494, 115 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1960); Bonney v. Granger, 300 S.C. 362,
365, 387 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)). The Investors court also looked
to other jurisdictions and found persuasive an Arkansas Supreme Court decision that
reached the same result on similar facts. Id. at 781 (citing Looper v. Madison Guar. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 292 Ark. 225, 729 S.W.2d 156 (1987)).
38. Id. at 782. However, the trial judge has discretion to determine whether the
prior sale occurred too long ago to allow the court to rely on the note and mortgage as
exclusive evidence of the current fair market value of the property. Id. (citing South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Estate of League, 251 S.C. 368, 162 S.E.2d 532 (1968)).
39. In the Poole decision, however, the negligence of the master's clerk resulted in
the omission of a party's bid and compromised the integrity of the sale. This "other
circumstance" invoked the second prong of the Poole rule. Poole, 174 S.C. at 157-58, 177
S.E. at 27.
40. 292 Ark. 225, 729 S.W.2d 156 (1987).
41. Id. at 227, 729 S.W.2d at 157.
42. Investors, 397 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Polish Nat'l Alliance v. White Eagle Hall
Co., 98 A.D.2d 400, 408, 470 N.Y.S.2d 642, 649 (1983)).
43. 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 285 (1848).
44. Id. at 298. In Coleman land worth between $5,000 and $6,000 sold for one dollar
subject to a mortgage of $1,500; therefore, the bid price represented between 25% and
30% of value.
45. 102 S.C. 308, 86 S.E. 681 (1915).
46. However, in Bonham the sale was set aside because of an inadequate price corn-
1991]
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language in Bonham in stating the rule of Poole.47 Although the first
prong of the Poole rule had never been applied and price alone had
never served as a basis for setting aside an otherwise bona fide and
nonfraudulent judicial sale in South Carolina, the Investors court did
not hesitate to apply the clear language of the rule because the facts of
the case warranted a set aside.
The court's failure to announce a standard for determining the ad-
equacy of the bid can perhaps be attributed to the impracticability of
doing so. As the Arkansas Supreme Court observed:
A price that "shocks the conscience" of a judge can never be reduced
to a mathematical formula. It depends on a variety of circumstances:
the value of the property, the circumstances surrounding the sale, the
price, the rights of the parties participating in the sale, and the harm
that may result if the sale is confirmed.. . 48
However, at least one bright line standard exists in South Carolina
precedent. In Turner v. Byars49 property worth $1,000 was sold to the
highest bidder for $450. Potential purchasers were unable to bid at the
sale because of automobile problems and sought to set aside the sale on
the ground that the bid was inadequate. The sale was bona fide in all
respects and there were no other circumstances warranting judicial in-
terference. Applying the Poole standard, 0 the court concluded that
"the disparity between the sales price and the value of the property
. . .does not shock the conscience of the court." '5 1 Therefore, Turner
stands for the proposition that a bid representing forty-five percent of
the property's value is not so grossly inadequate as to shock the court's
conscience and warrant judicial relief from the sale. 2 Based on the
court of appeals reference to New York precedent in the Investors de-
cision, however, it appears that the court would consider any bid of
less than ten percent to be grossly inadequate. 5
Especially when the creditor is demanding a deficiency judgment,
several adverse consequences of inadequate prices at judicial sales ex-
bined with a mistake of the officer conducting the sale. Id. at 311, 86 S.E. at 682.
47. Poole, 174 S.C. at 157, 177 S.E. at 27 (citing Bonham v. Cave, 102 S.C. 308, 86
S.E. 681 (1915)).
48. Looper v. Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 292 Ark. 225, 227, 729 S.W.2d 156,
157 (1987).
49. 230 S.C. 55, 94 S.E.2d 57 (1956).
50. Although it did not mention the Poole case, the court stated that "mere inade-
quacy of price (unless it shock[s] the conscience of the court) will not vitiate a judicial
sale." Id. at 58, 94 S.E.2d at 58.
51. Id.
52. This view is in accord with the holdings in a number of other jurisdictions.
Washburn, supra note 35, at 866 n.113 and accompanying text.
53. This also appears to be a generally accepted standard. Id. at 866 & n.112.
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ist. First, if the creditor's bid succeeds at a nominal amount, it will
achieve a result tantamount to a double satisfaction of the debt: mar-
ket value for the property upon resale and a deficiency judgment
against the debtor for almost the full amount of the debt." Second, the
debtor suffers a loss that perhaps is even greater than the creditor's
potential gain: the loss of both the property and any equity that the
debtor may have realized in a normal sale . 5 Finally, a third party un-
related to the mortgage transaction may acquire valuable property for
a nominal sum to the detriment of both the creditor and the debtor.
Although it is sound judicial policy to protect the sanctity of judi-
cial sales, it should not be the purpose of the law to protect those who
seek to procure valuable property with little or no payment. The court
of appeals application of the Poole rule in Investors gives equity courts
an important tool to prevent unjust results in judicial sales.
James Y Becker
III. SUBCONTRACTOR'S STATUTORY LIEN HAS PRIORITY OVER PRIOR
PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S ACCOUNTS
In Poinsett Construction Co. v. Fischer" the South Carolina
Court of Appeals held that a subcontractor's statutory lien in monies
received by the general contractor has priority over a previously per-
fected security interest in the general contractor's accounts receiv-
ables.57 The court based its holding on section 29-7-10 of the South
Carolina Code.5
In Poinsett a general contractor granted South Carolina National
Bank (the Bank) a security interest in its accounts receivables as col-
lateral for a loan. The Bank properly created and perfected the secur-
54. Id. at 849.
55. Id. at 850.
56. 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.E.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1990).
57. Id. at 345, 391 S.E.2d at 876.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-7-10 (Law. Co-op. 1991). Section 29-7-10 provides in part:
Any contractor in the erection, alteration or repairing of buildings in this
State shall pay all laborers, subcontractors and materialmen for their lawful
services and material furnished out of the money received for the erection, al-
teration or repairs of buildings upon which such laborers, subcontractors and
materialmen are employed or interested and such laborers, as well as all sub-
contractors and persons who shall furnish material for any such building, shall
have a first lien on the money received by such contractor for the erection,
alteration or repair of such building in proportion to the amount of their re-
spective claims.
1991]
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ity interest. The Bank then assigned its perfected security interest to
Ms. Fischer. Subsequently, the general contractor hired a subcontrac-
tor, Poinsett Construction Company (Poinsett), to complete a portion
of the construction on one of the general contractor's projects. Poinsett
completed the work and the general contractor received full payment
for the project on which Poinsett worked. The prime contractor en-
dorsed part of the proceeds over to Fischer59 and never fully paid Poin-
sett. After obtaining a judgment against the general contractor for the
deficiency, Poinsett sued and sought to satisfy its judgment from the
funds in Ms. Fischer's possession. Poinsett claimed a lien on the funds
based on section 29-7-10. The issue before the court was "whether
Poinsett's statutory lien has priority over the perfected security inter-
est assigned by the bank to Ms. Fischer, or vice versa."' 0
The court of appeals focused on the construction of section 29-7-
10 to resolve the priorities. The court relied on Spires v. Spires"1 and
held that because the statute explicitly grants subcontractors a first
lien on the money received by the contractor, "Poinsett's statutory lien
is a first lien and, thus, has priority over the security interest which
[the general contractor] gave the bank and the bank assigned to Ms.
Fischer. '6 2 Based on another well-settled rule of statutory construction
found in Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion,"3 the court of appeals rejected the circuit court's interpretation of
29-7-10.6" The court of appeals pointed out that the circuit court's in-
terpretation directly contradicts the explicit language of the statute,
which grants subcontractors a "first lien." The Poinsett court con-
cluded that the statutory language concerning the borrowing of money
merely clarifies that the statute does not preclude consensual liens on a
contractor's accounts. A contractor can continue to grant these liens,
but the liens would be subordinate to the statutory lien granted to the
59. Brief of Appellant at 2; Brief of Respondent at 3.
60. Poinsett, 301 S.C. at 344, 391 S.E.2d at 876.
61. 296 S.C. 422, 373 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1988). "Where a statute is clear and un-
ambiguous, there is not room for construction, and, the terms of the statute must be
given their literal meaning." Id. at 423, 373 S.E.2d at 699 (citing Duke Power Co. v.
South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 292 S.C. 64, 354 S.E.2d 902 (1987)).
62. Poinsett, 301 S.C. at 345, 391 S.E.2d at 876.
63. 129 S.C. 480, 124 S.E. 761 (1924). The Crescent court stated that "a statute shall
be given effect, and that a statute must receive such construction as will make all of its
parts harmonize with each other and render them consistent with its general scope and
object." Id. at 493-94, 124 S.E. at 765.
64. Poinsett, 301 S.C. at 345, 391 S.E.2d at 877. The circuit court predicated its
holding in favor of the perfected security interest "on the next-to-last sentence of Sec-
tion 29-7-10 which provides that 'nothing contained in this section shall be construed to
prevent any contractor or subcontractor from borrowing money on any such contract.'"
Id.
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subcontractor under section 29-7-10.15
The South Carolina Court of Appeals decision incorporates cogent
reasoning supported by settled principles of law. The practitioner
should be aware that under section 29-7-10 the statutory lien of a sub-
contractor or other laborer that has not been paid for work performed
has priority over the interest of a secured creditor with respect to
funds received by the general contractor regardless of when the se-
cured creditor's security interest was perfected.
C. Dan Wyatt, III
IV. NOTICE OF BREACH AFTER ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE STILL
AN OPEN QUESTION UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA'S COMMERCIAL CODE
Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales chapter of the South
Carolina Code,6" when a buyer accepts a seller's tender of goods before
discovering a defect, "the buyer must within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy. '67 The section does not specify
what information the notice must contain, nor does it specify what
form the notice must take. 8 In Southeastern Steel Co. v. W.A. Hunt
Construction Co.6 9 the South Carolina Court of Appeals discussed the
two prevailing notice requirement tests used in other jurisdictions, but
the court declined to adopt either test.
The Hunt Construction Company (Hunt) entered into a contract
with Southeastern Steel Company (Southeastern) to purchase steel
and steel products for use in two construction projects. Hunt accepted
Southeastern's tender of the steel and steel products. Hunt subse-
quently discovered defects in the steel and orally notified Southeastern
of the defects. Southeastern corrected some of the defects, but Hunt
corrected others at its own expense. Hunt also incurred costs when the
defective steel caused it to be late in finishing one of the construction
projects.
70
Mr. Hunt, the president of Hunt, met with the president of South-
eastern to discuss the balance due on Hunt's account. At the meeting
the balance was adjusted for an error, but Mr. Hunt did not indicate
that he intended to deduct the amount of the repair costs and the late
65. See id.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-101 to -809 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
67. Id. § 36-2-607(3)(a).
68. See id.
69. 301 S.C. 140, 390 S.E.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1990).
70. Id. at 141, 390 S.E.2d at 476-77.
1991]
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penalties from the bill.71 In fact, Mr. Hunt made no mention of his
intent to setoff these costs, despite being asked by Southeastern's pres-
ident whether there were "'any other problems or anything else
[which] needed to be taken care of.' "72
When Hunt failed to pay its bill, Southeastern brought suit to re-
cover the contract price of the steel. Hunt stipulated as to the amount
due, but asserted in its answer that it was entitled to a right of setoff
for the costs relating to the defects. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Southeastern on the issue of the amount due. At trial the
court 'also entered a directed verdict for Southeastern on the issue of
whether Hunt was entitled to a setoff. The lower court based its ruling
on the theory that Hunt had complied with neither the form nor the
contents of notice as required by section 36-2-607(3)(a).73 Hunt ap-
pealed the trial judge's decision to grant a directed verdict.
7 4
The court of appeals held that Hunt had not given adequate no-
tice to Southeastern. 7 The court reasoned that the content of Hunt's
statements was not adequate under either of the two major tests used
in other jurisdictions.'Therefore, the court affirmed the trial judge's
ruling that Hunt was barred from asserting a right of setoffi
7 8
The court's opinion is troubling for two reasons. First, although it
analyzed each of the two major tests used in other jurisdictions, the
court declined to adopt a standard for South Carolina, thereby perpet-
uating the current ambiguity surrounding section 36-2-607(3)(a)'s no-
tice requirements.7 7 Second, the court indicated in dictum that it
would be favorably inclined toward adopting a requirement that sec-
tion 36-2-607(3)(a) notices must be in writing.7
8
Much of the confusion surrounding the adequacy of notice under
section 36-2-607(3)(a) arises from the statute itself and the appended
official comment. The statute does not specify what the notice must
contain or what form the notice must take.7" Official Comment 4 to
section 36-2-607 discusses the notice requirement, but contains inher-
ent conflicts and can be used to support either a strict or lenient con-
tent requirement s0 This inherent conflict, among other reasons, led
71. Id. at 142, 390 S.E.2d at 477.
72. Id. (alteration by court).
73. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
74. Hunt, 301 S.C. at 141, 390 S.E.2d at 476.
75. Id. at 146-47, 390 S.E.2d at 479-80.
76. Id. at 147, 390 S.E.2d at 480.
77. Id. at 146, 390 S.E.2d at 479.
78. Id. at 142 n.1, 390 S.E.2d at 477 n.1.
79. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
80. Id. comment 4; see Hunt, 301 S.C. at 145, 390 S.E.2d at 479 (The first sentence
of the second paragraph of the comment supports the "lenient" standard; the fourth
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one commentator to state that section 36-2-607(3)(a)'s notice require-
ment is a "complex concept. '8 1 Leading commentators cannot agree on
whether a strict or lenient standard should apply to section 36-2-
607(3)(a)'s notice requirements.82 Other commentators have attempted
to draw strained distinctions between the leading strict standard case,
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,83 and the leading
lenient standard case, Oregon Lumber Co, v. Dwyer Overseas Timber
Products Co."4 The interpretation of section 36-2-607(3)(a)'s notice re-
quirements clearly is a difficult task which can be performed only by
each state's courts. The Hunt court unwisely shied away from this
task.
The court of appeals discussed both Eastern Air Lines and Oregon
Lumber and stated that it found the arguments for the adoption of
each standard "compelling."8 5 The court stated, however, that it found
it "unnecessary... to decide which standard should be applied be-
cause a careful review of the facts reveals that Hunt did not give ade-
quate notice of breach under either standard." ' The court then ap-
plied both standards and held that Hunt had not met the requirements
of either standard." The court also noted that a buyer must give the
seller some sort of notice; the return of goods for repair is not suffi-
cient.88 However, this brief statement does not alleviate the confusion
surrounding section 36-2-607(3)(a)'s requirements. By refusing to
sentence of the second paragraph indicates a "strict" standard).
81. Dillsaver, Notice of Breach After Acceptance of Tender, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 220, 237
(1985).
82. Compare R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607:43
(3d ed. 1983) (supporting a strict standard) with J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNiFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 11-10, at 484 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that "[q]uite clearly the drafters
intended a loose test").
83. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
84. 280 Or. 437, 571 P.2d 884 (1977). Dillsaver argues that the crucial difference in
cases which apply the two standards can be attributed to the identity of the parties. In
merchant-merchant transactions Dillsaver argues that the strict standard is applied.
However, in consumer-merchant transactions the lenient standard is applied. Dillsaver,
supra note 81, at 226-27, 233-34. Dillsaver's argument is specious. Both Eastern Air
Lines and Oregon Lumber involved merchant-merchant transactions.
85. Southeastern Steel Co. v. W.A. Hunt Constr. Co., 301 S.C. 140, 146, 390 S.E.2d
475, 479 (Ct. App. 1990).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 146-47, 390 S.E.2d at 479-80. Hunt argued that Southeastern was on
notice because it had either "'inspected or refabricated ... each defective material.'"
Id. at 147, 390 S.E.2d at 479. The court rejected Hunt's argument and distinguished
mere notice of facts from notice that the buyer considers these facts to constitute a
breach. Id. at 147, 390 S.E.2d at 479-80 (citing American Mfg. Co. v. United States Ship-
ping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.)).
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adopt either standard, the court has provided no guidance to South
Carolina merchants that discover a defect in goods that have been ten-
dered and accepted.
The court added to the confusion surrounding adequate notice by
noting that the lower court's reasoning for imposing a written notice
requirement under section 36-2-607(3)(a) was "compelling." ' 9 The trial
court relied on a rejection of goods case, Southeastern Steel Co. v.
Burton Block & Concrete Co.,90 to reach this conclusion.91 Burton
Block has been criticized as "only superficially sound" and "unwise. 92
The court should not perpetuate the false wisdom of Burton Block by
extending its written notice requirements to section 36-2-607(3)(a)
cases.
9 3
Hunt presented the court with a unique opportunity to relieve the
confusion surrounding section 36-2-607(3)(a)'s notice requirements. By
refusing to adopt a test for the adequacy of notice, the court has per-
petuated the confusion over content. The court's approval in dictum of
a written notice requirement will propagate further confusion over the
required form of notice. At the next available opportunity, the court
should adopt a standard for the content of notices and should reject
the notion that section 36-2-607(3)(a) notices must be in writing.
Lee Ann Anderson
89. Id. at 142 n.1, 390 S.E.2d at 477 n.1.
90. 273 S.C. 634, 258 S.E.2d 888 (1979); see S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-602 (Law. Co-op.
1976).
91. Hunt, 301 S.C. at 142 n.1, 390 S.E.2d 477 n.1.
92. Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, Form of Notification Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 32 S.C.L. REv. 69 (1980).
93. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 484; Dillsaver, supra note
81, at 224.
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